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Abstract 
Temporal discounting (TD) is the tendency to choose smaller, immediate rewards 
over larger, later rewards. Temporal discounting choices were studied in relation 
to cognitive abilities and self-control rating measures in a sample of children and 
adolescents aged 8 to14 years. First, we evaluated TD choices using measures 
typically used in the literature (indifference point, area under the curve, and k-
value), and explored their association with developmental level, cognitive abilities 
(comprised of IQ and executive function) and self-control ratings by parents. 
Second, we developed a novel way to study TD choices: categorization of choices 
into Now (consistent preference for immediate rewards), Switcher (switching 
from immediate to later rewards), Later (consistent preference for later rewards) 
and Random (random selection of immediate and later rewards) groups. The Now 
and Switcher choosers were the most frequent, and these groups were compared 
on cognitive abilities and the self-control ratings.  Results indicated that the 
indifference point, area under the curve, and k-value were not associated with 
developmental level, cognitive abilities, or self-control ratings. The Now and 
Switcher groups had significant relationships with developmental level, cognitive 
ability measures and self-control ratings. These findings suggest that, at this 
period of development many children may not recognize the competing choices in 
this task. The implications of assessing TD in developmental samples is 
discussed, including a comparison between TD and delay of gratification 
paradigms.  
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       Introduction 
Temporal Discounting and Cognitive Abilities in a Developmental Sample 
Temporal discounting (TD) refers to the tendency to choose smaller, immediate rewards 
over larger, later rewards (Critchfield & Kollins, 2001). For instance, when offered a choice 
between $20 now or $40 in a month, some people may prefer $20 now, even though waiting for 
an additional month would increase the rate of return by 100%. This preference reflects the idea 
that time delay may lead one to discount the value of a reward (choose sooner, smaller rewards 
over larger, later rewards). Although the TD measure is task specific (delay is measured on a 
specific condition), this paradigm has been studied as an index of self-control and impulsive 
behaviors (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Mischel, Shoda & Rodrigues, 1989; Shamosh & Grey, 
2008). TD has also been related to age and intelligence (Scheres et al., 2006; Steinberg et al., 
2009) as well as real world outcomes such as physical well-being, personal finances, and 
criminal offending (Bickel, Odum & Madden, 1999; Mofitt et al., 2011). 
          In community samples, ratings of impulsivity have been associated with choosing smaller, 
sooner rewards on TD tasks (Scheres & Sumiya, 2008). Temporal discounting is also 
significantly associated with intellectual abilities (Shamosh & Gray, 2008).  It has been found 
that higher scores on tests of cognitive abilities, as encompassing measures of executive 
functioning (EF) and IQ in this study, are associated with greater willingness to wait for larger, 
later rewards (Shamosh & Grey, 2008). Scores on tests of intellectual abilities also tend to 
increase developmentally (Salthouse & Davis, 2006). Similarly, ratings of self-control may 
provide another converging index of TD, as older children have been rated as displaying more 
self-control than younger children (Moffitt et al., 2011).  
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          Relatively less work has been done to examine TD in children and adolescents, in 
particular, associations between TD, cognitive abilities, and parent ratings of self-control. The 
purpose of the current study was to explore the relationship between TD, cognitive abilities and 
ratings of self-control in a developmental sample. Furthermore, sex differences in TD choices 
were examined. This study has implications for understanding variables in self-control and 
developmental differences in TD decision making task in children and adolescents.   
Defining Temporal Discounting  
 
Temporal discounting tasks generally require participants to make choices between a 
small variable reward and a larger constant reward available after a variable delay (Rachlin, 
Raineri, & Cross, 1991; Scheres et al., 2006). This task can be referred to as a “commitment-
choice” procedure because it requires the individual to commit to an immediate or delayed 
reward (Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2005). For the purpose of this study, the term “higher 
discounting” refers to the preference for a smaller, immediate reward over larger, later reward 
and “lower discounting” refers to the tendency to wait for larger, later reward over smaller, 
immediate reward. There are many reasons why people choose Now or Later options (Frederick, 
2006), but the focus of this study was on understanding individual differences (based on 
cognitive abilities) in those who choose immediate versus larger delayed rewards.  
The TD task is different from delay of gratification tasks (DoG), because DoG tasks 
require participants to wait for a reward during a delay period while a smaller reward is 
constantly available (Shamosh & Gray, 2008). Delays of gratification tasks are considered 
“sustained-choice” procedures because the choice between the immediate and delayed reward is 
available for the duration of the delay period (Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2005).  
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While several studies have found age differences on DoG tasks (Hongwanishkul et. al., 
2005; Johnson & Paulsen, 1980; Mischel & Metzner, 1962), studies on TD have not found 
similar results (Duckworth & Seligman, 2005; Scheres et. al., 2006). In a meta-analysis, 
Shamosh and Gray (2008) reported no differences between TD and DoG tasks in strength of 
association between discounting and intelligence. These findings may suggest that the paradigms 
of TD and DoG may be different to some extent (Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2005) and may be 
tapping into separable constructs developmentally. However, for the present study, both TD and 
DoG tasks were considered, given the fact that these tasks are often discussed together and are 
conceptually related in terms of assessing the choice between small immediate rewards versus 
larger delayed rewards.  
In TD tasks, there is an indifference point, where the participant will switch from 
preferring the immediate reward to the delayed reward. The indifference point represents the 
subjective value of the reward for the participant because it is the amount preferred (which will 
vary by participant) and is usually less than the face value of the larger delayed reward 
(Critchfield & Kollins, 2001). Steinberg and colleagues (2009) determined that the indifference 
point declines as the delay interval increases. Therefore, the longer one has to wait for a reward, 
the less value it holds in comparison to the sooner, immediate reward being offered. As such, the 
length of delay has been identified as an important variable in TD.  
Other TD variables can be described using a mathematical equation known as the 
hyperbolic function. Data in figure 1 is represented by the hyperbolic function (Mazur, 1987; 
Myerson & Green, 1995): 
                                                     ! = !!!!"  
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Where the A and V are the amount of delayed reward and discounted value of the 
delayed reward, respectively, and D is the delay. Another important dependent measure of TD is 
the k-value. The k-value is the sensitivity to delay or an individual’s rate of discounting (Green et 
al., 1996). A large k-value means a preference for smaller, immediate reward or higher 
discounting while a small k-value represents a preference for a larger, delayed reward or lower 
discounting. The preference for a reward depends on the magnitude of the reward. Lastly, area 
under the curve (AUC) is also calculated using the formula above. Figure 1 illustrates how 
changes in the preference for delayed rewards, affect the AUC (Critchfield & Kollins, 2011). 
The relationship between AUC and k-value is such that a large k-value will result in smaller 
AUC while a small k-value form a larger AUC. These three dependent variables have been 
examined in the developmental literature (Reed & Martens, 2011; Steinberg et al., 2009) and 
were also examined in the present study to assess TD.  
Temporal Discounting and Developmental Differences    
Although the literature in the area of TD and development is mixed, the suggestion that 
older children choose larger later rewards over smaller, immediate ones is supported across some 
studies (see Table 1 for a sample of such studies). In an early study of the phenomenon, Lessing 
(1969) reported no significant age differences between Grade 5, 8, and 11 in DoG tasks. In 
contrast, Paulsen and Johnson (1980), found delayed response on DoG tasks to increase with 
age, in a sample of children with age mean of 4.56 years, and the most marked change was 
between ages 8 and11. Similarly, Green (1986) found significant age-related decreases in 
discounting among children (M=12.1 years) and young adults (M=20.3 years) respectively, when 
using the DoG measures. This is the typical finding with DoG paradigm and may reflect the 
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strengthening of cognitive ability mechanisms that allow for better decision-making, reasoning, 
and the ability to exert self-control in delaying immediate rewards.  
Only a handful of more recent studies have examined age differences in TD during 
childhood and adolescence (Green et al., 1996; Scheres et al., 2006; Steinberg et al., 2009). 
Cohen and colleagues (2011) showed an age effect on TD tasks, with lower discounting in 15-
year-olds than 8- to 9-year-olds. In support of these results, in the Scheres et al. (2006) study, 
children aged 6 to 11 years showed higher discounting than adolescents ages 12 to 17 years. This 
study used a TD task in which the large reward (10 cents) was delayed by between 0 and 30 
seconds, and the immediate reward varied in magnitude (0–10 cents). Similarly, Green and 
colleagues (1994), reported developmental differences between three groups of 6th graders, 
young adults (M=20.3 years) and older adults (M=67.9 years), with the younger groups having 
more sensitivity to delay than older groups. Finally, an important study by Steinberg at al. (2009) 
recruited a sample of 935 participants, and found that younger adolescents consistently 
demonstrated a greater willingness to accept smaller immediate rewards than individuals 16 and 
older. This study adapted a TD task where the amount of the delayed reward was held constant at 
$1,000 with six varied delayed blocks (1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, and 1 year), 
presented in a random order. The respondents were asked to choose between an immediate 
reward of a given amount and a delayed reward of $1,000. Together these studies suggest that 
developmental differences in TD become more apparent in late childhood, but further research is 
needed in order to understand the nature of tasks and developmental patterns associated with 
them. One additional way to understand the development of TD is to examine whether it covaries 
with developmental differences in cognitive abilities.  
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What are Cognitive Abilities?         
Research has emphasized differences in cognitive abilities throughout development 
(Cattell, 1971; Flavell, 1982; Horn, 1968). The increase of specialized thinking mechanisms and 
knowledge from childhood to adulthood reflects developmental differences in cognitive abilities 
(e.g., Carroll, 1993). For instance, in a lifespan study, Li et al. (2004) examined correlations 
among a variety of basic processes including psychometric intelligence (i.e., fluid and 
crystallized intelligence) in a sample aged 6 to 89 years. Their results support the longstanding 
theoretical assumption (Baltes et al., 1980) that intellectual abilities and cognitive processes are 
more homogenous in childhood, and gradually become more specialized in adolescence and 
young adulthood. This finding was also consistent with better performance on intellectual 
abilities and EF measures in older children than younger children (Salthouse & Davis, 2006).  
Further evidence for developmental changes in cognitive ability are the differentiation of 
functions, mainly developed in prefrontal cortex (PFC), referred to as , a family of top-down 
mental processes needed for goal directed behavior (Diamond, 2013). EF skills are essential in 
reasoning, problem solving and decision-making (Collins & Koechlin, 2012; Lunt et al., 2012). 
They include inhibition, set-shifting and working memory (WM). Inhibition refers to controlling 
one’s attention, behavior and thoughts to override distracting external stimuli utilizing self-
control, selective attention and cognitive inhibition (Diamond, 2013). Research has established 
the improvements in inhibition with age (Anderson, Anderson & Lajoie, 1996; Moffitt et al., 
2011).  Development of inhibition throughout childhood plays a critical role in self-regulatory 
behavior, reasoning, and decision-making. For instance, younger children show less inhibition on 
timed tasks than older children (Diamond, 2013). Similarly, developmental improvements in set- 
shifting (the capacity to switch rapidly between tasks), and WM (the ability to mentally 
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manipulate and hold information in mind) have been reported in the literature (Anderson, 2002; 
Cowan, Saults, & Elliot, 2002; Cowan et al., 2011; Crone et al., 2006; Espy, 1997; Luciana et al., 
2005).  
  Many studies that have adopted the differentiation of EF in children have found similar 
patterns of findings (Espy et al., 2011; Hughes, Ensor, Wilson, & Graham, 2010). For example, 
Lee and colleagues (2013) used cohort-sequential design to examine developmental changes in 6 
to 15 year olds and found differences in the structure of EF, and higher EF abilities among 15 
year olds than 8 and 11 year olds. Moreover, there was a strong correlation between the three 
above-mentioned domains, and children with higher WM, exhibited faster reaction time in 
inhibition and set-shifting tasks. The development of EF with age may account for planful, 
anticipatory decision-making in older children than younger children. In support of this 
difference, Salthouse and Davis (2006) reported age effects on EF measures in children ages 5 to 
17 years, with a significant increase in performance of older children than younger children.  
Understanding the development of EF paradigms is critical in studying TD, as well as its 
relationship with cognitive abilities in this population. Thus, based on this existing literature, it 
was predicted that older children would display higher intellectual and EF abilities than younger 
children.   
Temporal Discounting, Intelligence and Executive Functions  
           The association between IQ, EF and TD has been examined empirically. Studying this 
association is important, as cognitive abilities and development are both indicators of the 
capacity for more complex thinking and competencies. Shamosh and Gray (2008) conducted a 
meta-analysis of the relationship between TD paradigms and intelligence. These authors found 
that people with higher intelligence (i.e., IQ) were more willing to wait for larger, later rewards. 
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Therefore, it would be expected that people with higher intelligence scores, would also 
demonstrate increased ability to delay rewards.  
 Steinberg and colleagues (2009) also found that indifference points were positively 
related to IQ in a sample of people aged 10 to 30 years old. In other words, the higher the IQ, the 
higher the indifference point (amount at which the subjective value of an immediate reward is 
equivalent to the value of a delayed reward). This implies that people with higher IQs are more 
willing to wait for larger, later rewards because they do not devalue these rewards as quickly as 
those with lower IQs. This study included an examination of whether these associations are 
stronger in older children than younger children as TD/cognitive ability paradigms are expected 
to develop with increasing age.  
Executive functions are another domain of cognitive abilities that are associated with TD 
although the results across the literature are somewhat discrepant. For instance, inhibition has 
been examined in relation to delay discounting and no association was found (Lamm, Zelazo, & 
Lewis, 2006), however, this finding has not been replicated. Similarly, Cuskelly and colleagues 
(2003) found no significant developmental effect between TD and EF measures, yet they 
reported ratings of self-control to be significantly associated with TD tasks. This may suggest a 
relationship between TD and self-control. Other studies have reported associations of TD and set 
shifting (Hongwanishkul, Happaney, Lee, & Zelazo, 2005), and TD and inhibition (Shoda, 
Mischel, & Peake, 1990). Examining the association between TD and the cognitive abilities of 
IQ and EF informs us whether TD is associated with cognitive abilities and self-control ratings 
developmentally.  
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Sex Differences in Temporal Discounting 
The TD literature on sex differences is somewhat mixed. The majority of studies that 
have examined TD in boys and girls have not found significant differences between the sexes. 
For instance, out of the 16 TD and DoG studies reviewed in the literature, five of the studies did 
not study sex differences while ten did not find differences between the sexes (see Table 1). One 
study that did find gender differences in TD, utilized a unitary self-discipline composite by 
combining parent, teacher, self-control ratings and TD questionnaires (Duckworth & Saligman, 
2006).  Girls were found to be more self-disciplined than boys as determined by their overall 
GPA, and performance on achievement tests.  Moreover, girls were more likely to wait for 
delayed rewards compared to boys. More research is needed in order to understand self-control 
differences between boys and girls as measured by TD tasks.  
Summary 
Temporal discounting is the tendency to prefer smaller, immediate rewards to larger, later 
rewards. Temporal discounting has been studied as an important indicator of self-control. The 
limited research has shown some support for the idea that the willingness to wait for larger, later 
reward on temporal discounting tasks is associated with developmental stage, as are EF, 
intelligence, and self-control. More specifically, EF and cognitive flexibility have shown a 
longer developmental progression in adolescence and early adulthood than childhood. Temporal 
discounting has not been looked at specifically in relation to the cognitive abilities and self-
control ratings and therefore this study examined these associations in a developmental sample. 
Sex differences in TD were also explored. There were 5 specific hypotheses for this study:   
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Hypothesis 1 
 Children in Grades 6 to 9 will discount less (show increased preference for larger, later 
rewards) than children in Grades 2 to 5. There will be developmental differences in Indifference 
Point, Area Under the Curve and the k-value between the two groups. 
Hypothesis 2 
 There will be developmental differences in performance on EF, and intelligence measures 
with older children performing better on cognitive ability measures than younger children.   
Hypothesis 3 
 IQ and executive functioning, as measures of cognitive ability are associated with TD, 
and ratings of self-control. There will be a higher association of the above-mentioned variables 
in older children than younger children.  
Hypothesis 4 
Older children will receive higher parent ratings of self-control than younger children. 
More specifically, children who discount less (show preference for delayed rewards) will receive 
higher parent ratings of self-control.  
Hypothesis 5 
 In support of previous literature, this study hypothesizes no significant sex differences in 
TD task.  
   
      Method  
Participants 
 A developmental sample of 252 8 to 14-year-old participants (130 males and 122 
females) was recruited from the Greater Toronto Area. The communities fro mwhich the 
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participants were recruited from were middle to upper income, with families mainly from 
European descent. Assent was obtained from the child and consent from his/her parent before 
proceeding with the study. Participants were recruited through posters in the community and 
local school boards. The participants were divided into two groups: Grade 2 to 5 (n=134) and 
Grades 6 to 9 (n=118). As inclusion criteria, participants must have been between 8 and 15 years 
of age (Grades 2-5, 6-9). One participant was eliminated from the original sample due to not 
meeting the inclusion criterion in the study (age criterion). There were no exclusion criteria in 
this study.     
 The mean age of the sample was 10.65 years (SD = 1.88). The Grade 2 to 5 group 
comprised 53.2% of the sample, and 46.8.0% of the participants were in Grades 6 to 9 (see Table 
2). 
 
Measures  
Temporal Discounting  
A temporal discounting task modeled on the hypothetical money choice task used by 
Rachlin et al. (1991) was used in this study.  This task required individuals to make a choice 
between a small, immediate reward or a fixed larger, delayed reward. The Appendix displays all 
of the trials for this task. The hypothetical rewards task was used since no differences between 
real and hypothetical versions of the task have been found in the literature (Johnson & Bickel, 
2002; Locey, Jones, & Rachlin, 2011). There were five blocks of delay periods (one day, two 
days, 30 days, 180 days, and 365 days) in conjunction with one delayed reward of $10. The 
immediate variable reward changed in a sequential manner by factors of 1. The typical 
administration of this task involved administering each reward magnitude at each delay first in 
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ascending then in descending order.  For example, the immediate reward began by $1 increments 
in a descending manner ($10, $9, $8, $7, $6, $5, $4, $3, $2, and $1) and was followed by an 
ascending sequence of ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10). Each participant made a total of 
100 choices (5 delay periods x 10 trials). The dependent measures in the temporal discounting 
task were the Indifference Point (IP), Area Under the Curve (AUC), and the k-value.  
The Now, Switcher, Later and Random Categories  
A novel way of examining the data was to look at temporal discounting in a categorical 
form, which became apparent after data analysis began. This was organized such that the sample 
was categorized into four groups of Now choosers (consistently choosing immediate rewards 
over later rewards), Later choosers (consistently choosing later rewards over immediate 
rewards), Switchers (switching between immediate to later rewards), and Random choosers 
(switching back and forth between now and later rewards).  
Cognitive Ability  
Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence (WASI) – Vocabulary and Matrices Subtest. 
The Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning subtests of the WASI were used as a measure of 
cognitive ability using an estimated IQ score (WASI; Wechsler, 1999). The Vocabulary subtest 
involved participants providing verbal definitions of increasingly difficult words. The Matrix 
Reasoning subtest required the participant to determine which of five options best completes a 
pattern in a series of pictures, with each item becoming increasingly more difficult. The raw 
scores on these subtests were converted into z-scores and summed to create a composite measure 
of intellectual ability for use in the analyses (M= -.05; SD= 1.79, range= 10). Higher composite 
scores indicated higher intellectual abilities. 
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Sentence Span Task. The Sentence Span task was used to measure working memory 
(originally developed by Daneman and Carpenter [1980] Working memory is the ability to hold 
information in mind while manipulating it when necessary (Miyake, Friedman, Emreson, Witzki, 
& Howerter, 2000). This study used the adapted version of sentence span by Gottardo, 
Stanovich, and Siegel (1996).  The task is a simple word span task, with the added component of 
the comprehension of sentences. Participants listened to sets of two to five statements and 
indicated whether each statement was true or false. After responding to each of the sentences in a 
set, the child was asked to recall the final word of each sentence in the set. Recall accuracy was 
the dependent measure (M=20.10; SD= 3.12; range= 25). Higher scores on this task were 
indicative of better working memory abilities.  
Stroop Test. The Stroop test (1935) was used in this study as a measure of inference 
control, a type of inhibition (Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Strauss, Sherman & Spreen, 
2006). Interference control refers to the ability to filter out irrelevant information and to select 
relevant information.  The task included three different conditions: a naming of coloured 
rectangles condition, a naming of coloured words condition, and an interference condition. In the 
coloured rectangles condition, participants were presented with a chart of 24 coloured rectangles 
presented in four columns and six rows array. Participants were asked to name the colour of each 
rectangle as quickly as possible without making any errors and were timed on this task. In the 
second condition, the participant was presented with a series of coloured words printed in 
different ink presented in an array of four by six matrix. The participants were asked to state the 
colour of ink of each word as quickly as possible without making any errors. In the interference 
condition, participants were presented with a chart of 24 words presented in a matrix of 4 
columns and 6 rows. In this condition, the colour naming words (red, green, blue, and yellow) 
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appeared in a different coloured ink (red, green, blue or yellow) than the colour to be named. For 
example the word ‘red’ appeared in the colour yellow.  Participants were asked to name the 
colour of ink as quickly as possible without making any errors. The interference condition was 
the most difficult of the three conditions because the participants needed to inhibit a response 
from the competing modality that is, naming the words. Time to complete each trial, the number 
of errors, and the number of self-corrections were scored for each trial (M=1.50; SD= .17; 
range=. 96). An interference score was calculated by subtracting the time to complete the 
interference condition minus the time taken to complete the colour naming condition (Macleod, 
1991; Strauss, et al., 2006), with a higher score indicative of greater inhibitory problems.  
The Trailmaking Test (TMT; Reitan, 1958). The TMT was used as a measure of set-
shifting. Set-shifting is a cognitive task that requires one to display flexibility when there are 
changing rules/schedules of reinforcement in the environment (Barkley, 1998; Strauss et al., 
2006).  The TMT consists of two parts, Part A and Part B. Participants completed practice items 
for both parts. Part A required the participant to connect with a pencil line 25 numbered circles, 
in numerical order without lifting the pencil off the paper. Part B consisted of 13 numbered and 
12 lettered circles, and the participant was instructed to alternate between numeric and alphabetic 
order, going from 1 to A to 2 to B to 3 to C, etc., until they had exhausted all of the circled 
numbers and letters. The dependent measure of interest in this task was total completion time on 
part B minus total time on Part A, as this discrepancy represents the total additional time 
required for the participants to ‘shift set’ between numbers and letters (M= 1.98; SD= .18; 
range=1.04) A higher score indicated lower set-shifting.  
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Parent Rating of Self-Control 
The Strengths and Weaknesses of ADHD-symptoms and Normal Behaviour Scale 
(SWAN; Swanson et al., 2009) assesses inattention and hyperactive and impulsive behaviours. 
This scale was used to assess self-control in the current study, as similar scales have been used to 
assess self-control in other studies (Moffit et al., 2011). The SWAN Scale included the 18 
diagnostic criteria for ADHD based on the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000). The SWAN differs from 
most behavior rating scales used for assessing developmental psychopathology in that the 
symptoms of ADHD are reworded using a strength-based rather than a weakness-based 
formulation as in the DSM-IV. For instance, the DSM-IV symptom “Often avoids, dislikes, or 
reluctantly engages in tasks requiring sustained mental effort” is reworded as “Engage in tasks 
that require sustained mental effort” and  “Often fidgets with hands or feet or squirms in seat” is 
rephrased as  “Sit still (control movement of hands/ feet or control squirming)”.  The informant 
was asked to rate the child’s behavior for each of the 18 items using a 7-point scale ranging from 
“ far below average” to  “far above average”, relative to other children of the same age over the 
past month.  The SWAN has been shown to have strong cohesiveness among items rating 
inattention (mean inter-item correlation = .64) and hyperactivity/impulsivity (mean inter-item 
correlation of .66; Young et al., 2009). Higher scores on this scale indicated greater self-control. 
 
Procedure 
Three trained examiners tested participants. At the beginning of each testing session, 
participants were informed that they could have the questionnaires read to them by the examiner.  
In total, six participants opted to have some, if not all, of the measures read to them. The order of 
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measures administered were as follows: Child Assent, WASI Vocabulary and Matrices, Stroop, 
Trailmaking, Sentence Span, and Temporal Discounting Task.  
Results  
 
Statistical Analyses 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted in order to examine developmental differences in TD; the 
relationship between age (as separated by two Grades of 2-5 and 6-9) and dependent variables of 
TD task (k-value, AUC, IP) was analyzed. Correlation analyses were conducted to determine the 
associations between intellectual ability measures, EF and TD dependent measures within each 
Grade group and in the full sample. An independent t-test was used to analyze associations 
between cognitive abilities and TD at each delay period  (one day, two days, 30 days, 180 days 
and 365 days). Furthermore, t-tests were used to measure significant differences between the 
Now and Switcher groups at each of the five delays, between all the measures (cognitive ability 
and self-control rating). Using chi-square analyses, significant proportional differences between 
the Now choosers and Switchers at each delay (five delay periods) was measured. Lastly, sex 
differences were explored by conducting t-tests to measure any significant differences between 
boys and girls. For the current study, an alpha level of p = .05 was used to indicate significance. 
Developmental Differences on Temporal Discounting, Executive Functions, Cognitive 
Abilities, and Self-control Ratings  
The dependent measures related to the temporal discounting task are displayed in Table 
3. Independent t-tests were conducted to compare developmental differences on intellectual 
abilities, EF and self-control ratings. The participants in Grades 6-9 showed higher intellectual 
abilities and EF than the participants in Grades 2-5.  There were no significant differences 
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between Groups on self-control ratings. The mean indifference point, AUC and the k-value did 
not differ significantly between the two grades (see Table 3).  
Correlations Between TD, Cognitive Abilities, and Self-Control Ratings 
 Pearson Correlations between cognitive abilities, TD and self-control ratings were 
examined (see Table 4). Intellectual ability (IQ) was significantly correlated with EF and self-
control rating scale. The EF variables were correlated with one another and the self-control 
rating scale, but not with any of the TD variables.  Self-control ratings were also significantly 
correlated with IQ, stroop, trailmaking, but a significant relationship with TD variables was not 
found. Although all the TD variables were significantly associated with one another, the only 
variable that was significantly correlated with self-control ratings was the indifference point. 
Therefore, none of the TD variables were associated with EF and IQ.   
Frequency Distribution of Now Choosers, Later Choosers, Switchers and Random 
Choosers on Temporal Discounting  
A novel coding scheme was developed to assess TD choices that became apparent after 
the data had been collected. In particular, it was discovered that there were different profiles in 
how the participants responded on the TD task. Only part of the sample actually switched to 
making a choice for the larger delayed reward (Switchers), and a large proportion of the sample 
consistently chose the smaller immediate choice (Now Choosers). Then, a minority of the sample 
consistently chose the larger delayed reward (Later choosers) or displayed random responding 
(Random group). Additional analyses were conducted based on these categories that had been 
coded.  The frequency of Now choosers, Later choosers, Switchers, and Random choosers were 
examined on the temporal discounting task (See Table 5). The frequency of the groups shows 
that the Now choosers comprised of the 2.1-67.9%, of the sample and the Switchers comprised 
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of 29.3-87.3% of the sample. On the other hand, the Late choosers (2.4-8.1%) and the Random 
group (0.4-2.5%) comprised of a lower frequency in the sample. The focus on the relationship of 
Now choosers and Switchers is important as there was higher frequency of these two categories 
in the sample. There were higher numbers of Now choosers as delay increased and fewer 
numbers of Switchers at larger delays. The mean percentage of the Now group was 2.1% at the 
1-day delay, 34.2% at the 30-day delay and increased to 67.9% at the 365 days delay period. 
That is, the size of the Now group increased as the delay time got larger. The mean percentage of 
the Switchers was 87.3% at the one day delay, 63.3% at the 30 days delay and decreased to 
29.3% at the 365 days delay period. Therefore, although the tendency of both groups’ was to 
wait for the larger reward decreased at the 365 days delay, the Switcher group tended to wait 
longer for delayed rewards than the Now group. Thus, given the higher frequency of Now and 
Switcher groups, these two groups were used for further analyses of developmental differences 
and associations with cognitive ability.  
The Relationship between Cognitive Abilities, Executive Functions and Self-Control 
Ratings among Now and Switcher Groups 
 The Now and Switcher groups were compared on overall intellectual ability and the 
executive functioning composites and self-control rating as presented in Table 7.  One- and two-
day delay periods were not included in the analyses as frequency in these groups was too low for 
statistical comparison. 
 Independent t-tests were conducted to examine the relationship among cognitive 
variables, EF and self-control ratings between the two categorical groups: Now and Switchers. 
There was an overall significant mean difference in the mentioned measures between both 
groups during the 30 days, 180 days and 365 days delay times. That is, the higher the intellectual 
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ability and the EF composite scores, the amount of discounting (preference for immediate 
rewards) decreased. The relationship between self-control ratings and delay intervals was 
positive and reflects the same pattern.  There was a significant relationship among 30 days, 180 
days, and 365 days delay period and self-control ratings, indicating that parent ratings of self-
control between both groups are associated with longer delay periods.  
There was no significant difference between cognitive abilities and EF at the one-day and 
two-day delay periods. It is important to note that the groups were very unbalanced for these two 
comparisons. For the one day delay period, the proportion of Switchers (n=206) and the Now 
group (n=5) were unbalanced and similar numbers were observed at the two-day delay with 
Switchers (n=205) exhibiting higher numbers than the Now group (n=19).  
Frequency of Now and Switcher Groups in the Developmental Sample Using Chi-Square 
Analyses 
Separate chi-square analyses were conducted between groups of (Now x Switcher) on 
five categories of TD delay periods (see Table 5).  Five analyses were conducted to compare the 
Now and Switchers at each of the delay periods. Results indicated significant differences in three 
delay periods between these two categories. Results indicated no significant difference among 
one day (χ²(1) = .09, ns), and two days  (χ²(1) = 2.18, ns) delay.  Chi-square post-hoc analyses 
revealed the proportion of children in Grades 2-5 and Grades 6-9 to be significantly different at 
the 30 days, 180 days and 365 days. At the 30 day-delay period, the proportion of the Now group 
was higher in Grades 2-5 than Grades 6-9 while the Switcher’s category was higher in Grades 6-
9 than Grades 2-5. The same relationships were observed in the 180 days and 365 days delay 
intervals. There were more participants in Grades 6-9 in the Switcher group than the Now group. 
Thus, there were more Switchers in the older grade groups while there are more exclusively now 
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choosers in the younger grade groups. Post-hoc comparisons confirmed these patterns, indicating 
that the proportion of Now choosers and Switchers in Grade 2-5 were significant at intervals of 
30 days, 180 days and 365 days. Similarly, the proportion of Now choosers and Switchers in 
Grade 6-9 was significant at the 30 days, 180 days and 365 days.  
Sex Differences 
Independent t-tests were conducted to examine sex differences in TD, cognitive abilities, 
and self-control ratings. As predicted, there was an overall significant mean difference in boys 
and girls in self-control rating measure with girls rated higher on parent self-control measures 
than boys. Higher scores represent better self-control. Although girls showed higher mean scores 
than boys on all EF, intelligence abilities and TD variables, only indifference point at the 30- day 
interval and AUC were significant. Similarly, an independent t-test was conducted and there was 
a significant relationship between sex, category of Now choosers and Switchers at the two-day 
delay period. Thus, there was a higher proportion of girls in the Switcher category that preferred 
waiting for a larger, later reward than boys. Other delay periods were not significantly 
associated.   
Discussion 
Summary of Findings  
The present findings demonstrated developmental differences in cognitive ability (IQ and 
EF) but no developmental differences were found on temporal discounting variables as measured 
by the AUC, k-value, and indifference point dependent variables. Participants in Grades 6-9 had 
higher scores on cognitive ability, EF and self-control ratings compared to children in Grades 2-
5. Using a novel scoring scheme the sample was categorized into four groups of Now choosers 
(consistently choosing the immediate rewards), Later Choosers (consistently choosing the 
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delayed reward), Switchers (switching from the immediate to the delayed reward), and the 
Random Group (random selection of immediate and delayed rewards). Independent t-tests 
revealed significant mean differences between the Now choosers and Switchers on cognitive 
ability, EF and self-control ratings at the three delay periods of 30 days, 180 days and 365 days. 
When examining the proportion of Now choosers and Switchers, the latter tended to wait longer 
for larger, delayed rewards while the former preferred the immediate, smaller reward. Chi-square 
analyses revealed significant developmental differences at the 30-day, 180-day and 365-day 
intervals in Now and Switcher choosers. This indicates a higher number of Switchers among 
older children preferring delayed TD choices and a higher proportion of Now choosers among 
younger children. The results point to the importance of considering Now and Switcher 
categorical forms in understanding TD in developmental samples. These categories are an 
informative method of measuring and conceptualizing temporal discounting in a developmental 
sample. Further research is needed to replicate these results as this is the first study to explore 
TD using categorical analysis.  
Developmental Differences in TD, Cognitive Abilities, and Self-Control 
One of the important findings in the current study was the lack of developmental 
differences in TD variables (IP, AUC and k-value). This is generally consistent with previous 
literature that has examined developmental effects in TD tasks (Johnson & Paulsen, 1980; 
Lessing, 1969; Tweedie, 1966), with the exception of a couple of studies. Scheres and colleagues 
(2006) reported significant associations between age and AUC in a sample of 6 to 11-year-olds 
and 12 to 17 year-olds in ADHD and control groups. In this study, participants received real 
money before starting the task, which may have increased the salience of the reward in younger 
children. Scheres and colleagues (2006) used a clinical sample, which contributed to variability 
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in their sample as well as extreme scores. Also, an increased sensitivity to cash beforehand may 
have led to increased motivation to wait longer for later rewards. One comprehensive study 
conducted by Steinberg and colleagues (2009) that employed the same TD task as the present 
study, reported developmental differences between children and youth below 16 years and youth 
above 16 years of age. This finding may support the lack of capturing developmental differences 
among children aged 8 to14 years in the current study. It may be the lack of sampling above 16 
years of age that accounts for no significant findings in this study. Moreover, delayed rewards 
may be more difficult to foresee for younger children when the reward is hypothetical. Our 
findings are consistent with Steinberg’s theory that younger children are less future oriented as 
they have more difficulty thinking ahead and considering the future than older children 
(Steinberg et al., 2009).  
Although the literature is mixed in reporting developmental differences in TD variables, 
most studies that report developmental differences used DoG tasks that are different in nature 
from TD tasks. An interesting difference between TD and DoG is the developmental onset 
differences and cognitive capacity these tasks capture (Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2005). While 
children in studies that have used DoG tasks to predict long-term developmental outcomes are 
able to perform these procedures as early as 3 to 4 years of age (Mischel, Ebbensen & Zeiss, 
1972; Mischel et al., 1989), children younger than ages 8 to 9 have not been able to perform on 
TD tasks in a way that demonstrates their sensitivity to delay (Reynolds, Schiffbauer, Swenson 
& Karraker, 2001; Steinberg et al., 2009). With such age differences in sensitivity to delay, it is 
possible that DoG and TD tasks measure somewhat different processes, with TD tasks assessing 
a more mature cognitive process, thus tapping into distinct developmental abilities.  
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The second important finding in the present study is developmental differences in 
cognitive ability and EF measures but not self-control ratings. As predicted, this study confirmed 
previous findings on the positive relationship between age and cognitive abilities (Anderson, 
2002; Diamond, 1995, 1996, 2013; Zelazo, Lamm & Lewis, 2006). This study found no 
developmental significance in self-control ratings. This may be because of less variability in a 
nonclinical sample; the self-control rating measure (SWAN) was originally designed for clinical 
samples, suggesting it may be less sensitive to normal variation in self-control. However, the 
mean averages of self-control ratings indicate a trend in the predicted direction, with children in 
Grades 6-9, receiving higher self-control ratings than children in Grades 2-5. In support of this 
finding, a study reported no age differences in parent/teacher SWAN ratings in a community 
sample of 1025 students. Sex differences were reported with higher ratings of self-control for 
girls than boys (Murray et al., 2008). In contrast, studies with clinical samples have reported age 
effects in parent/teacher ratings of inattention (Connors, 2007; Murray et al., 2009). It seems that 
the SWAN is more sensitive to capturing impulsivity in clinical samples due to more variance of 
symptoms than is present in community samples. 
Temporal Discounting, Now and Switcher Choosers  
A novel contribution of this study was to categorize choices into Now, Switcher, Random 
and Later categories on the TD task. The focus was on the relationship between the Now 
choosers (always preferring immediate rewards over delayed rewards) and the Switcher group 
(switching from the immediate to the delayed rewards) as the majority of the sample choices 
comprised these two groups.  
It is important to note that the discrepancies in frequency of the Now and Switcher 
groups is task dependent. For some of the choice items, most participants (younger children) are 
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more likely to prefer the now option while for other items, participants (older children) are likely 
to switch and choose a delayed option. This pattern is likely because of the nature of the items on 
the TD task. While the frequencies are not statistically conclusive, they reflect on developmental 
differences in preference for now and delayed choices.  
Results indicated significant age differences in cognitive abilities and self-control ratings 
between Now and Switchers at the larger delay periods. More specifically, these developmental 
differences between the Now and Switchers were present for the 30-day, 180-day and 365-day 
delay intervals. The proportion of older children clustered in the Switcher groups and the 
younger children clustered in the Now group was significant. The Switchers may have been 
more likely to recognize the choice between a smaller reward now and a larger reward later, and 
those children that made any shift to later at any time during the task had higher cognitive 
abilities. The Now group may have more difficulty with recognizing the gains of later rewards 
and what they would do with that gain in the extended future. This is supported in findings of 
cognitive ability, where significant cognitive ability differences are reported between these two 
groups. Even developmentally, children in the older grades clustered in the Switcher category 
tended to exhibit higher cognitive abilities, EF and self-control ratings than children in the 
younger grades.  
The differences between the Now choosers and Switchers compliment the two-process 
theory of individual differences in decision-making. According to the two-system theory 
modeled by Stanovich and West (2000), there is a heterogeneous set of systems involved in 
decision making: System 1 is a heuristic response that can be characterized as default, automatic 
and requires less mental effort. System 2 requires decontextualization, as it requires overriding 
heuristic responses to arrive at a decision. According to Stanovich and West (2008), it is in the 
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cases where the analytic response has to override automatic responses where we observe 
individual differences in problem solving (see Figure 2). Arriving at a System 2 response 
requires the individual to be available to carry out an override, detect the need to override, 
sustain inhibition to carry the override and lastly the cognitive ability to sustain an override. As 
elaborated by Stanovich, West, and Toplak (2011), it is critical to understand that System 2 
processing does not always equate to correct responding and System 1 does not equate with 
normatively incorrect processing. However, what is evident is the difference in cognitive 
processes of a System 1 and System 2 responders.  
With respect to the findings of this study, the Late choosers can be conceptualized as 
showing a System 2 response at all times. This study’s findings suggest that the Switchers are 
perhaps showing the override and thus generate a System 2 response, while Now choosers are 
System 1 responders, generating a heuristic, effortless response. The developmental 
consequences of the two-system theory are integrated with the concept of mental conflict in TD 
tasks. It is possible that the Now choosers and younger children do not undergo the same mental 
conflict (steps required to override an automatic response). The developmental associations with 
cognitive ability are valid indicators in supporting the idea that the nature of TD task may be 
different for younger children than it is for older children.   
Developmental predictions are complex when examining reasoning in children.  
Temporal discounting tasks are capturing something different in younger children compared to 
older children and the notion of multiple minds and systems to recognize conflict may be present 
in Switchers but absent in the Now group. Therefore, examining the data in such a way allows 
for a broader perspective in understanding decision making in children and adolescents. From the 
present study, it became apparent that certain predictions about self-control in children emerges 
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by the categorization of Now and Switcher groups that otherwise would be lost using the 
traditional TD dependent variables.  
Temporal discounting findings in this study based on the Now versus Switcher analyses 
are aligned with the literature on cognitive ability and developmental effects. Consistent with 
previous literature (Cohen et al., 2011; Hongwanishkul et al., 2005; Lessing, 1969; Mischel & 
Metzner, 1962; Steinberg et al., 2009), there is a positive association between cognitive abilities, 
TD and age. This indicates that participants who recognized the conflict in the choices 
(Switchers) were children who have better developed cognitive abilities. Both intelligence and 
EF had a significantly positive relationship with TD performance, with higher EF scores 
associated with more Switcher than Now chooser responses. Similar parallels were found in the 
current study as the Switcher group, significantly comprised of older children, tended to delay 
reward while the Now choosers, mainly comprised of younger children, preferred immediate 
rewards. The developmental relationship between Now choosers and Switchers is an important 
finding as it conceptualizes the difference in self-control and possible nature of TD tasks in 
younger children versus older children. 
Sex Differences  
One of the exploratory questions of this study was whether there are any sex differences 
in TD choices. As predicted, girls received higher parent self-control ratings on the SWAN 
measure, consistent with previous literature (Duckworth & Saligman, 2011; Murray et al., 2009). 
One would expect higher self-control ratings to be associated with lower discounting in girls but 
the results did not show any significant differences, except at a 30-day interval for the IP 
dependent variable. This result is expected, as most studies in the literature have not reported any 
TD differences. Although girls exhibit higher cognitive ability and EF means (but not 
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significantly different), that can be associated with higher self-control ratings, this developmental 
stage may not be capturing such differences.  
Limitations of the Current Study and Future Directions  
 The first limitation was the type of sample used. Since the sample was from a mostly 
middle class sample, with children showing average to above average intelligence, there was not 
much variance, which may have produced higher effects in TD statistical analyses. Since this 
sample was normative, there were lower levels of self-control in parent rating measure as well. If 
there had been more variance, it may have produced significant developmental effects in self-
control ratings in the statistical analyses.  In the future, clinical and community samples should 
be used to confirm the current results.  
 In order to further examine the Now versus Switcher groups, it would be useful to ask 
further exploratory questions from participants to determine whether or not they displayed 
conflict in each judgment. When the participant reached their indifference point (the subjective 
value when the immediate and delayed reward are equal), she/he could be asked why such choice 
was made. Future research should also include a measureable way to assess whether a participant 
experiences conflict in making a choice between an immediate or delayed reward. It helps to 
understand what group of children recognize to override heuristic, automatic responses for a 
delayed choice and what group of children do not acknowledge any mental effort/conflict in 
making choices. This element is important as it helps to explain how TD choices are different 
across age, and the processes involved in making such choices.  
Implications of the Current Findings  
 The findings in the current study as well as the novel method of assessing self-control in 
development contribute to the literature of TD in several important ways.  Temporal discounting 
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has been studied through different lenses in order to gain greater perspective on the concept of 
self-control across development and in relations to intellectual abilities.  On one hand there is the 
classical study of delay of gratification and the Marshmallow Task that seems diagnostic 
(Mischel & Metzner, 1962), and on the other hand there is the most current and comprehensive 
study by Steinberg and colleagues (2009) that does not find TD differences in younger children. 
The current study adds insight to the literature by recognizing TD differences in children aged 8 
to 14 years and developing new methods to evaluate and assess such differences.  It is important 
to reconsider the nature of this task and how it can explain self-control in unique ways through 
the span of development. This study also highlights the need for understanding processes 
involved in reasoning and decision making in children and the importance of developmental 
sensitivity.  
Conclusion 
 The current study replicated findings that demonstrated cognitive abilities increase with 
age. An important finding was lack of significant developmental effects in TD variables. 
Developmental differences in TD task choices were examined through a novel method of 
categorizing the data into Now, Switcher, Random and Later choosers. The temporal discounting 
variables were all highly related and showed a consistent relationship at intervals of 30 day, 180 
day, and 365 day between Now and Switcher choosers. This finding indicated that there are 
significant differences between the two groups with the Now choosers’ preference for immediate 
rewards and the Switcher group’s preference for delayed rewards. Moreover, the proportion of 
children in Grades 6 to 9 was higher in the Switchers group while the proportion of children in 
Grades 2 to 5 was higher in the Now group. Taken together, these findings present the idea that 
effortful processing in TD tasks may be applicable to older children while younger children may 
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be processing this task differently. This expands how we conceptualize TD from a 
developmental perspective.    
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Appendix I 
 
Temporal Discounting Curve Task Instructions 
 
Examiner to present stimulus cards with amounts of money.   
 
“Now I am going to ask you to make some choices. Let’s pretend that you can choose 
between the following amounts of money.” 
 
For each item, give a further prompt for the time delay so that the length of time is made 
more salient (do separately for each):  
 
-1 day is tomorrow. Today is ______, so it would mean waiting till tomorrow, which is _____. 
-For two days, today is _______, and two days from now would be waiting till ______. 
-For 30 days: 30 days is one month away. So it would mean waiting a month. Now it’s the 
beginning/middle/end of _____, so it would mean waiting till the beginning/middle/end of 
______. 
- For 180 days: 180 days is six months away. So it would mean waiting 6 months. Now it’s the 
beginning/middle/end of _____, so it would mean waiting till (naming months in between) the 
beginning/middle/end of ______. 
-For 365 days, 365 days is one year away. So it would mean waiting 1 year. Now it’s the 
beginning/middle/end of _____, so it would mean waiting till (naming months in between) the 
beginning/middle/end of ______. 
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Temporal Discounting Curve Task 
1. Descending 
$ Now OR $Later 
$10 now ______ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$9 now _____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$8 now _____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$7 now _____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$6 now _____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$5 now _____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$4 now _____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$3 now _____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$2 now _____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$1 now_____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
 
1. Ascending 
$ Now OR $Later 
$1 now ______ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$2 now _____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$3 now _____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$4 now _____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$5 now _____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$6 now _____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$7 now _____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$8 now _____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$9 now _____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
$10 now_____ OR $10 in 1 day ______ 
 
 2. Descending 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
$ Now OR $Later 
$10 now ______ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$9 now _____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$8 now _____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$7 now _____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$6 now _____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$5 now _____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$4 now _____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$3 now _____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$2 now _____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$1 now_____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
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 2. Ascending  
$ Now OR $Later 
$1 now ______ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$2 now _____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$3 now _____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$4 now _____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$5 now _____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$6 now _____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$7 now _____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$8 now _____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$9 now _____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
$10 now_____ OR $10 in 2 days ______ 
 
3.Descending 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.Ascaneding 
  
$ Now OR $Later 
$10 now ______ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$9 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$8 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$7 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$6 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$5 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$4 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$3 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$2 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$1 now_____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$ Now OR $Later 
$1 now ______ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$2 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$3 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$4 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$5 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$6 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$7 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$8 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$9 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
$10 now _____ OR $10 in 30 days ______ 
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4. Descending 
$ Now OR $Later 
$10 now ______ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$9 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$8 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$7 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$6 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$5 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$4 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$3 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$2 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$1 now_____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
 
4. Ascending 
$ Now OR $Later 
$1 now ______ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$2 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$3 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$4 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$5 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$6 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$7 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$8 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$9 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
$10 now _____ OR $10 in 180 days ______ 
 
5. Descending 
$ Now OR $Later 
$10 now ______ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$9 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$8 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$7 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$6 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$5 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$4 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$3 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$2 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$1 now_____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
 
5. Ascending 
$ Now OR $Later 
$1 now ______ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$2 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$3 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
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$4 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$5 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$6 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$7 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$8 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$9 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
$10 now _____ OR $10 in 365 days ______ 
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Table 1 
 
Temporal Discounting, Intelligence, Executive Functioning and Sex Differences in Developmental Samples 
 
Study Sample Size Age Range M Results  
Ainslie, Balkan,  
Barke, Castellanos, 
Djikstra, Reynolds,  
Sonuga & Scheres 
(2006) 
N=56 
ADHD (n=22) 
Control (n=24) 
 
Males (n=34)  
Females (n=22) 
6-11 years  
12-17 years  
Temporal 
Discounting  
Task(TD) 
 
Probabilistic 
Temporal 
Discounting 
Task (PD) 
 
 
Developmental Differences: 
ADHD group did not differ in rate of discounting than 
control group for either of the TD tasks. F (1,42) = .69, 
n.s.; η2  = .02 
 
Younger participants discounted delayed rewards 
significantly more strongly than adolescents on both 
versions of the TD task F (1,42) = 4.3; p  < .05; η2  = .09 
 
Relationship between Temporal Discounting and EF/IQ: 
 
PD was correlated significantly and positively with TD in 
the ADHD , r=.51 , p<.05 but not in the control group, 
r=.21, ns  
 
Sex Differences: 
Not Studied 
Banich , Cauffman,  
Graham, O’Brien, 
Steinberg & Woolard 
(2009) 
 
N= 929 
 
  
 
Malesv(n=455) 
Females (n= 
474) 
10 –11(N 116), 
12 –13 (N137), 
14 –15(N128),  
16 –17(N 141), 
18 –21(N 148),  
22-25 (N 136),  
26 –30 (N 23) 
Wechsler 
Abbreviated 
Scale of 
Intelligence 
(WASI) Full-
Scale IQ Two-
Subtest 
 
Developmental Differences: 
A decline in planning ahead between ages 10 and 15 (r=-
.12, p < .05), but an increase in planning from age 15 on 
(r=.21, p<.001) 
 
Significant effect of age on discount rates, F (6, 832)= 6.62,  
p < .001, n 2 = .05, between individuals aged 13 and 
younger, and  those aged 16 and older, on the other; 
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Future 
Orientation Self 
Report Measure  
 
Delay 
Discounting 
Task 
Individuals ages 14-15 fell in between  
 
Relationship between Temporal Discounting and EF/IQ: 
 
Temporal discounting and future orientation are predictive 
of an individual’s indifference point but planning ahead 
subscale are not (! =.126, t= 3.39, p <001; !=.161, t= 4.03, 
p< .001; and !=.059, t= 1.49, ns , respectively) 
Relationship between IQ and Individual’s discount rate is 
r=-.27  
The relationship between delay discounting and motor 
impulsivity were r=.36 
The relationship between delay discounting and EF batteries 
were r=.10  
 
Sex Differences: 
Discount rate is unrelated to sex  
 
Block, J., & Funder, 
D. C. (1989) 
 
N=104 
Males (n=50) 
Females (n=54) 
14 years Delay 
Gratification 
(DoG) 
 
WISC 
 
WAIS-R 
 
Developmental Differences: 
N/A 
 
Relationship between DoG and EF/IQ: 
Correlation between DoG and IQ: r=. 35* (higher IQ scores 
are related to more delay) 
 
Sex Differences: 
The mean delay score for female subjects was 4.57 
(SD=1.04) and for male subjects were 4.38 (SD=1.33). The 
sex difference did not approach significance, t (102)= .84, ns 
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Braswell, Kendall & 
Zupan (1981) 
N=98 
 
Males (n= 45)  
Females (n=53) 
Grades 2-5 
9.4 years 
Delay 
Gratification 
(DoG) 
 
Teachers Self-
Control Rating 
Scale (SCRS) 
 
PPVT IQ 
Developmental Differences: 
N/A  
 
Relationship between DoG and EF/IQ; 
Intercorrelations of DoG and PPVT IQ: ns 
 
Sex Differences: 
Boys and girls differed significantly on the SCRS, F (1,96) 
= 15.60, p< .001, with boys rated as having less self-control 
than girls 
Cohen, Kesek, Lamm, 
Lewis, Principe & 
Zelazo (2011) 
 
N=102 
Males (n=50) 
Females 
(n=52) 
8-15 years  Iowa Gambling 
Task 
 
Color Word 
Stroop 
 
Temporal 
Discounting 
 
Digit Span 
 
 
 
Developmental Differences: 
Main effect of age group F (3, 94) = 3.00, p < .05, !2 = .09 
revealed that 8-9 years old group revealed higher k-values 
than 14-15 years old group 
 
Relationship between Temporal Discounting and EF/IQ: 
 
Delay Discounting and Iowa Gambling task were not 
significantly correlated r=-.19  
Delay discounting and Digit Span were correlated at a trend 
level r=-.15 
Delay Discounting and Stroop did not approach significant 
correlation, r=.09 
 
Sex Differences: 
Sex comparisons were not significant 
Cuskelly, Hayes & 
Zhang (2003) 
Group 1(Down 
syndrome): 
N=25 
 
Group 1: 6.25-
14.25 years 
with mental age 
of 4 
Self-imposed 
Delay of 
Gratification  
 
Developmental Differences: 
Not Studied 
 
Relationship between DoG and EF/IQ: 
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Group 2 
(Control): 
N=32 
 
 
Group 2: 3.9 
years with 
mental age of 
30- 60 months 
Stanford-Binet 
Intelligence 
Scale -IV 
 
Significant difference between waiting times for the two 
groups on the self-imposed delay task 
Group 2 waited longer 11.26 min (SD=6.1) than group 1 3.8 
min (SD=5.9) 
 
Sex Differences: 
Not studied 
Duckworth & 
Seligman (2005) 
N=140 
Male (n=62) 
Female (n=78) 
Grade 8  
13.4 years  
Kirby 
Delay-
Discounting 
Rate Monetary 
Choice 
Questionnaire 
 
Self-Control 
Rating Scale 
Questionaire 
 
Standardized 
Achievement 
Test Scores 
Developmental Differences: 
N/A 
 
Relationship between Temporal Discounting and EF/IQ: 
Not Studied  
 
Sex Differences:  
Gender differences were greatest on delay discounting task 
(d= .08), with females more self-disciplined than males 
Females were more self-disciplined than males on all 
measures t (138) = 4.12, p = .001, d =.71 
Green, Fry & 
Myerson (1994) 
N=36 
Group 1: 12  
Group 2: 12 
Group 3: 12 
 
Sex proportion 
not reported 
Group 1: 12.1 
years  
Group2: 20.3 
years 
Group 3: 67.9 
years  
Delay 
Discounting 
Task 
 
Developmental Differences:  
6th Graders discounted $1,000 more steeply than did young 
adults, t (12) = 4.424, p < .001 and young adults discounted 
more steeply than did older adults, t (12) = 4.852, p < ,001 
S parameter (sensitivity to delay) for the children and young 
adults differed significantly, t (12) = 4.281, p < .01, but not 
for young adults and older adults, t (12) = 1.206  
The value of S increased substantially across the life span 
(from 0.37 to 0.72 to 5.0) 
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Relationship between DoG and EF/IQ: 
N/A 
 
Sex Differences:  
N/A 
Gray & Shamosh,  
(2008)  
Meta analysis 
24 Studies 
Meta analysis  Delay 
Discounting  
 
Intelligence 
(several 
measures were 
included) 
Developmental Effects: 
N/A 
 
Relationship between Temporal Discounting and EF/IQ: 
 
Association between IQ and Delay discounting was negative 
in direction, small to moderate range 
 
Sex Differences: 
Not Studied 
 
Hongwanishkul, 
Happaney, Lee & 
Zelazo (2005)  
 
N=98 
Males (n= 40) 
Females (n= 
48) 
3.0 - 5.9 years Delay of 
Gratification 
Task (DoG) 
 
Children’s 
Gambling Task 
 
Dimensional 
Change Card 
Sort (DCCS) 
Developmental Differences: 
3-year-olds chose to delay on DoG task less often than 4 and 
5year olds 
 
Relationship between DoG and EF/IQ: 
DoG and Children’s Gambling Task: r=.24*  
DoG and DCCS: r=.21*  
 
Sex Differences:                                                                              
No significant gender effects F(2, 92) = .28, ns,  2 = 
p=006 
Johnson & Paulsen 
(1980) 
N=55  
Males (n=27) 
38- 72 months Delay 
Gratification 
Developmental Differences:  
Delayed response (delaying larger rewards) increases with 
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Females (n=28) (DoG) 
  
Peabody 
Picture 
Vocabulary 
Test (PPVT) 
 
Teacher Rating 
of Impulsivity  
 
IQ score (Not 
Specified) 
age with the most marked change happening between Grade 
3 and 4, r= .65 
1st to 3rd Grade showed no significance chi square for linear 
regression of 0.23 while chi-square linear regression was 
significant X2=7.08, df=1, p<. 01 for Grade 4 to 6 
 
Relationship between DoG and EF/IQ: 
Delay Gratification measure was significantly correlated 
with (TR), r=.28  but not with other measures 
 
Sex Differences:  
The one-way MANOVA for the age-sex interaction was 
significant, Wilk’s F=3.05, df=8, 92, p=. 004 with less 
errors in MFFT task in girls than boys ages 5, 4 and 3 
respectively 
Lessing (1969) N=558 
5th, 8th, 11th 
Grade 
 
Males (n=201) 
Females 
(n=357) 
Not Reported Delay 
Gratification 
(DoG) 
 
 
IQ (type not 
specified)  
Developmental Differences:  
The difference between grades on DoG (F= .62,  p>.05), ns 
 Higher means for 11th than 8th  Graders on SCS F=7.47 
p<.01) 
 
Relationship between DoG and EF/IQ 
Correlation between DoG and IQ was r=. 23  
DoG was significantly and positively related to GPA only in 
grade 8. F= 7.18, p<. 01 
 
Sex Differences: 
No sex differences among 8th and 11th Graders 
Lindqvist, Roth, 
Sjowall & Thorell, 
(2013)  
 
N=102(ADHD) 
N=102 
(Control) 
 
7-13 years Size Ordering 
Task 
 
Digit Span 
Developmental Differences:  
Not Studied  
When studying group differences, the children with ADHD 
performed more poorly than controls with regard to all 
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Males (n=97) 
Females (n=56) 
 
Go/No-Go Task 
 
Choice Delay 
Task  
neuropsychological functions except delay 
Aversion 
Relationship between Temporal Discounting and EF/IQ: 
No significant relationship between TD and other measures 
 
Sex Differences:  
No main effects of sex and no interaction effects of group 
and sex were found 
 
 
Metzner & Mischel 
(1962) 
N= 162 
Males (n=68) 
Females n=58) 
7.5 years Delay 
Gratification 
(DoG) 
 
IQ scores 
Pintner  
General Ability 
test 
Verbal Series 
Forms A or B 
(no references 
given) 
Developmental Differences: 
Delayed response (delaying larger rewards) increases with 
age with the most marked change happening between Grade 
3 and 4, r=. 65, p<.05 
1st to 3rd Grade showed no significance chi square for linear 
regression of 0.23 while chi-square linear regression was 
significant X2=7.08, df=1, p<. 01 for Grade 4 to 6 
 
Relationship between DoG and EF/IQ: 
N/A 
 
Sex Differences: 
Gender differences were not significant X2=2.306, df=1, 
p>.10 
 
Mischel, Peake & 
Shoda (1990) 
 
 
N=185 
Males (n=82) 
Females 
(n=103) 
 
4-18 years 
SAT Verbal 
and 
Quantitative 
Scores 
 
 
Developmental Differences: 
N/A 
 
Relationship between DoG and EF/IQ: 
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California 
Child Q-Set 
 
Delay 
Gratification 
(DoG) 
 
 
DoG was correlated with verbal intellectual ability r=.39, 
delay rule knowledge r=.52 and attention deployment r=.51 
 
Sex Differences: 
Not Reported 
Tweedie (1966) N=36 
 
Males (n=30) 
Females (n=16) 
8-10 years Delay 
Gratification 
(DoG)  
 
 
Teacher 
Ratings of Self-
control 
 
Developmental Differences: 
The younger girls (8 to 9.5) were compared with the older 
girls (9.5 to 11 years) and no significant difference was 
found in their number of delayed responses. There was also 
no differences found between the younger and older boys, 
t=. 482, p < 0.4  
 
Relationship between DoG and EF/IQ: 
 
There was no significant relationship between ratings of 
restlessness and ratings of delay, X2= .0462, ns p<. 05 
 
Sex Differences: 
The girls that displayed higher DoG did not differ in teacher 
ratings than girls who displayed lower DoG t=1.485, p< 0.1 
The boys that displayed higher DoG did not differ in teacher 
ratings than boys who displayed lower DoG t=. 710, p< 0.25   
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Table 2 
 
Demographic Characteristics of Sample  
 
Variable 
 
 M   (SD) n 
 Female 
 
Male 
 
 
---- 122 
 
130 
 
Age 
(years) 
8-12  
 
13-15  
 
10.00   (1.45) 
 
13.36   (0.56) 
203 
 
49 
 
Grade 2-5 
 
6-9 
 134 
 
118 
 
Total  252 
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Table 3 
 
Means and Independent t-test for Temporal Discounting, Executive Functions, Self-
Control Ratings Among Two Grade Samples  
Measures  Grades 2-5 
M (SD) 
Grades 6-9  
M (SD)  
t  
 
Cognitive Abilities 
Intellectual ability composite -.82 (1.63) .82 (1.55)  -8.13 *** 
 
Executive functions (EF) 
 
Stroop 
 
1.60 (.14) 
  
1.40 (.16)  
 
8.20*** 
Trail making  2.07 (.16)  1.90 (.16)  8.45*** 
Sentence span 19.30 (3.10) 21.00 (2.92)  -4.31*** 
Self-control rating 85.00 (17) 87.40 (17)  -1.04 
 
Temporal discounting  
   
 
Indifference point (IP) 
   
1day 8.40 (2.30) 8.15 (2.20)  .84 
2days  6.70 (2.90)  6.63 (2.90)  .98 
30days  4.52 (3.32)  4.30 (3.20) .60 
180days 2.84 (2.70) 3.00 (3.01)  -.45 
365days 2.45 (2.52) 2.43 (2.73)  .06 
 
Area under the curve 
 
-.58  (.30)  
 
-.60  (.31)  
 
.34 
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Note.*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
k-value -1.20 (1.00)  -1.11 (1.04) -.70 
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Table 4 
Intercorrelations between Cognitive Ability Measures, Executive Functions and Temporal Discounting Measures 
    
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.    
IQ            
1. Intellectual 
Ability 
1           
EF          
2.Stroop 
3.Trailmaking 
4.Sentence 
span 
-.467** 1          
-.551** .505** 1  
.461** -.356** -.485** 1 
Temporal 
Discounting 
           
5.AUC 
6.Indifference 
point 
7.k-value  
Self-control 
-.072 -.011 -.022 -.055 1       
-.055 .007 -.038 .002 .870** 1  
       
.077 -.012 -.005 -.011 -.893** -.799** 1 
       
8. SWAN .214** -.200** .258** .127 -.127 -.183** .107 1    
*p<.05, **p<.01, Note. Area Under the Curve (AUC), The Strengths and Weaknesses of ADHD-symptoms and Normal Behaviour Scale (SWAN) 
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Table 5 
Frequency Distribution of the Now, Switchers, Later and Random Group 
Categories in Each Temporal Discounting Delay Period 
                                                          Category  
Delay Now 
n (%) 
Switcher 
n (%) 
Later 
n (%) 
Random 
n (%) 
N 
 
1day  5  (2.1) 
 
206 (87.3) 19 (8.1) 6 (2.5) 236 
2days  19(8.1) 
 
205 (87.2)   7 (3.0) 4 (1.7) 235 
30days  81(34.2) 
 
150 (63.3)   5 (2.1) 1 (.4) 237 
180days 140(57.6) 
 
  96 (39.5)   5 (2.1) 2 (.8) 243 
365days 167(67.9)   72 (29.3)   6 (2.4) 1 (.4) 246 
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Table 6 
Frequency of Now and Switcher Categories Based on Developmental Groups  
 
Delay periods 
(days) 
Now n (%) Switchers n (%) Chi-square  
1day Grades 2-5 
 
Grades 6-9 
 3  (2.68%) 
 
 2  (2.20%) 
109 (97.32%) 
 
  97 (97.98%) 
 
-- 
 
 
2 days Grades 2-5 
 
Grades 6-9 
 
13 (11.11%) 
 
  6 (5.61%) 
104 (88.89%) 
 
101 (94.39%) 
-- 
30 days Grades 2-5 
 
Grades 6-9 
59 (49.17%) 
 
22 (19.82%) 
  61 (50.83%) 
 
  89 (80.18%) 
 
12.81*** 
180 
days 
Grades 2-5 
 
Grades 6-9 
85 (58.55%) 
 
55 (49.11%) 
  39 (41.45%) 
 
  57 (50.89%) 
 
9.12** 
365 
days 
Grades 2-5 
 
Grades 6-9 
98 (79.03%) 
 
69 (60.00%) 
  26 (20.97%) 
 
  46 (40.00%) 
10.26** 
Note. p<.01**, p<.001***, [The one day and two days delay intervals were not examined 
for significance due to small group sizes] 
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Table 7 
Average of Cognitive Abilities Variables and Self-Control Ratings in Five Delay Periods between the Now and 
Switcher Groups 
Measures Now Group  
M (SD) 
n Switcher Group  
M (SD) 
n    t (df) Effect Size  
Cohen’s d 
WASI composite    
30days -.69(1.80) 81 .39(1.69) 150 -4.58*** -.62 
 
180days -.38(1.70) 140 .50(1.70) 96 -3.94*** -.51 
 
365days 
 
-.28 (1.72) 167 .72 (1.65) 72 -4.20*** -.59 
Stroop    
30days 1.56 (.16) 81 1.46 (.17) 150 4.30*** .60 
 
180days 1.52 (.17) 140 1.46 (.17) 96 2.90** .33 
 
365days 
 
1.52 (.17) 167 1.43 (.18) 72 3.87*** .07 
Trailmaking    
2days 2.08 (.22) 19 2.00 (.18) 205 2.48* .81 
 
30days 2.07 (.19) 81 1.93 (.17) 150 5.41*** .77 
 
180days 2.02 (.19) 140 1.93 (.15) 96 3.62*** .52 
 
365days 2.01 (.18) 167 1.92 (.16) 72 3.52*** .52 
Sentence span    
30days 19.48 (3.05) 81 20.58 (3.09) 150 -2.58** -.35 
 
180days 19.66 (3.18) 140 20.87 (2.90) 96 -2.30** -.39 
 
365days 19.89 (3.04) 167 20.80 (3.30) 72 -2.07* -.28 
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Self-control rating    
30days 81.75(16.16) 77 89.29 (16.95) 131 -3.14** -.45 
 
180days 82.39 (15.88) 130 91.97 (16.85) 83 -4.19*** -.58 
 
365days 84.54 (16.23) 156 90.48 (18.15) 60 -2.32* -.34 
Note. p<.05*, p<.01**, p<.001*** 
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Figure 1: Critchfield & Kollins’ Graphical Display of the Temporal 
 Discounting Data (2001) 
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Figure 2: Stanovich & West’s Framework for Differences in Decision Making (2008) 
